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a b s t r a c t
Small world topologies are thought to provide a valuable insight into human brain organisation and consciousness.
However, functional magnetic resonance imaging studies in consciousness have not yielded consistent results.
Given the importance of dynamics for both consciousness and cognition, here we investigate how the diversity
of small world dynamics (quantiﬁed by sample entropy; dSW-E1 ) scales with decreasing levels of awareness
(i.e., sedation and disorders of consciousness). Paying particular attention to result reproducibility, we show
that dSW-E is a consistent predictor of levels of awareness even when controlling for the underlying functional
connectivity dynamics. We ﬁnd that dSW-E of subcortical, and cortical areas are predictive, with the former
showing higher and more robust eﬀect sizes across analyses. We ﬁnd that the network dynamics of intermodular
communication in the cerebellum also have unique predictive power for levels of awareness. Consequently, we
propose that the dynamic reorganisation of the functional information architecture, in particular of the subcortex,
is a characteristic that emerges with awareness and has explanatory power beyond that of the complexity of
dynamic functional connectivity.

1. Introduction
Recent neuroscience endeavours have approached the intractable
question of consciousness via notions of complexity (CarhartHarris et al., 2014; Northoﬀ and Huang, 2017; Tononi et al., 2016;
Varley et al., 2020). A complex system can be deﬁned as a large
network of components that exhibit collective emergent properties
(Mitchell, 2011). In fact, consciousness researchers have focused their
attention not only on the activity of brain regions; but also the statistical
relationship between them (i.e., “connectivity”) and the resulting emergent global properties (Tononi et al., 2016; Edelman and Gally, 2013;
Di Perri et al., 2016; Stamatakis et al., 2010).
A prominent paradigm to investigate the complexity of brain connectivity is given by network science (Rubinov and Sporns, 2010; Watts and
Strogatz, 1998). Using the mathematical framework of Graph Theory Analysis (GTA), network science permits an investigation into the

∗

topological/architectural characteristics of a network by deﬁning its
components as nodes and their interactions as edges. Watts and Strogatz (1998) brought this approach to the forefront by showing that
complex real-life networks of the most disparate kinds tend to show
a “small-world” (SW) architecture. Computationally, the SW network
structure can be created by taking a regular lattice network (where
neighbouring nodes are connected) and randomly rewiring some edges.
This particular network conﬁguration simultaneously retains many clusters of connected nodes, whilst the rewired edges enable information
to travel easily across long distances in the network (i.e., an average
“short path length”). The SW network is appealing to neuroscience
as it putatively describes the fundamental local-global interaction of
a limited number of brain regions and connections, and thus would
allow complexity to emerge in a cost-eﬀective manner (Northoﬀ and
Huang, 2017; Sporns and Zwi, 2004; van den Heuvel et al., 2008;
Bassett and Bullmore, 2017). In fact, SW topology has been shown to
favour synchronisation, richness of possible states, self-organisation,
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criticality, resistance to insult, eﬃcient and cost-eﬀective information
transfer (Papo et al., 2016; Tan and Cheong, 2017; Barahona et al., 2002;
Takagi, 2018; Takagi, 2020).
Given these characteristics, theorists have conjectured that SW organisation is relevant to consciousness (Northoﬀ and Huang, 2017;
Sporns and Zwi, 2004; Carhart-Harris and Friston, 2019; Buzsáki, 2007;
Alkire et al., 2008). In fact, SW is a topology (i.e., interrelation of constituent parts) that indicates simultaneous localised-clustered (segregated) and eﬃcient-global (integrated) information ﬂow (Northoﬀ and
Huang, 2017; Rubinov and Sporns, 2010; Bassett and Bullmore, 2017;
Lord et al., 2017; Deco et al., 2015). Theoretically, dynamic integration would underpin the sense of uniﬁed experience, whilst segregation
of specialised information would underlie the vast variety of perceptual and phenomenal distinctions that can be experienced (Northoﬀ and
Huang, 2017; Tononi et al., 2016; Sporns and Zwi, 2004; Dehaene and
Christen, 2011; Baars, 2005). Therefore, SW has been thought to underlie the spatial temporal characteristics necessary for the emergence
of awareness (Northoﬀ and Huang, 2017; Buzsáki, 2007; Alkire et al.,
2008).
The empirical side, conversely, has proposed several measures of
SW architecture (Humphries and Gurney, 2008; Muldoon et al., 2016;
Telesford et al., 2011); but has not yielded the same level of consistency
as its theoretical counterpart. Research in the functional network SW of
anaesthesia has shown increases in SW during unconsciousness, in opposition to what would have been expected from theory (Northoﬀ and
Huang, 2017; Schroter et al., 2012; Monti et al., 2013). Others show
decreases in SW during anaesthesia and disorders of consciousness
(Luppi et al., 2019; Barttfeld et al., 2015). Still more papers report inconclusive SW results in consciousness-relevant conditions (Achard et al.,
2012; Crone et al., 2014; Godwin and Barry, 2015). There are also contradicting results arising from structural connectivity measurements of
SW conﬁgurations (Weng et al., 2017; Tan et al., 2019).
The brain is characterised by constantly changing dynamical interactions (Supplementary movie; James (1890)). Analogously to the
proposed importance of SW topology to dynamic information ﬂow
(Watts and Strogatz, 1998; Bassett and Bullmore, 2017; Tan and
Cheong, 2017; Barahona et al., 2002; Takagi, 2018), diﬀerent theories of
consciousness converge in proposing that the dynamic richness of possible brain states is a fundamental hallmark of consciousness (CarhartHarris et al., 2014; Northoﬀ and Huang, 2017; Tononi et al., 2016;
Dehaene and Christen, 2011). The study of dynamics in consciousness research has in fact proven empirically successful (Luppi et al.,
2019; Barttfeld et al., 2015; Huang et al., 2020; Demertzi et al., 2019;
Golkowski et al., 2019; Cavanna et al., 2018; Crone et al., 2020) and
there is some evidence of how disruption of small-world topology may
occur in consciousness in particularly integrated states (Luppi et al.,
2019). Furthermore, there is evidence that the temporal variability of
the clustered-segregated component of SW topology is reduced in unconsciousness due to brain injury (Crone et al., 2020).
Although SW structure is universally recognised as important for
network dynamics (Watts and Strogatz, 1998; Tan and Cheong, 2017;
Barahona et al., 2002; Takagi, 2018), most studies of consciousness looking into such network topologies have primarily focused on static networks (Schroter et al., 2012; Monti et al., 2013; Achard et al., 2012;
Crone et al., 2014), networks clustered across time (Luppi et al., 2019)
or have not assessed unique predictive power of diﬀerent measures in
diﬀerent subsystems and states of consciousness (Crone et al., 2020).
To tackle the inconsistencies between diﬀerent empirical studies and
theory, and to probe the relevance of network science to consciousness,
we investigated the dynamics of small-worldness (SW). Given the dynamic nature of subjective phenomenology and the brain, and the balance between integration and segregation being proposed as essential to
uniﬁed experience (Tononi and Edelman, 1998), we hypothesised that
the temporal complexity of small worldness would be a strong predictor
of levels of awareness. Such network dynamics may relate to a fundamental mechanism (integration and segregation) in producing the (dy-

namically varying) stream of consciousness. Thus, we reduce the high
dimensionality of connectivity data to properties that describe network
architecture in terms of integration and segregation. To investigate how
complex (“unpredictable” or “uncompressible”) network architectures
are over time, we use an information-theory measure adapted to biological dynamical systems, namely sample entropy (Delgado-Bonal and
Marshak, 2019; Richman and Moorman, 2000). This metric, previously employed for fMRI data (e.g., Richman and Moorman, 2000;
Omidvarnia et al., 2021; Wang et al., 2014; Pedersen et al., 2017), has
been shown to be robust in noisy and short timeseries and speciﬁcally
considers temporal contiguous information (unlike previously employed
approaches, Crone et al., 2020). Sample entropy has also been shown
to be correlated to other measures of complexity indicating that it is
robust and may successfully be used to measure underlying complexity
((Varley et al., 2020); see section 2.6 for more details).
Given previous inconsistencies in this area, we devote particular
attention to convergence of SW results by deploying diﬀerent brain
parcellations (i.e., region deﬁnitions that form network nodes), measures and datasets. Parcellations, which varied between the aforementioned SW studies (Schroter et al., 2012; Monti et al., 2013;
Luppi et al., 2019), have been known to aﬀect graph theory results
(Papo et al., 2016; Yao et al., 2015; Hallquist and Hillary, 2018;
Luppi and Stamatakis, 2020). Therefore, the employment of diﬀerent
parcellations to assess whether results are parcellation-dependent is advised (Hallquist and Hillary, 2018). We used whole-brain parcellations
with diﬀerent granularities (i.e., Low and high granularity, 126 and
553 brain regions, respectively, described in Appendix A, and, respectively, named WB126 and WB553) and the AAL (Automatic Anatomical Labelling atlas), which has been extensively used in previous literature (Schroter et al., 2012; Luppi et al., 2019; Weng et al., 2017;
Tan et al., 2019). To further assess convergence of results we chose to
employ two diﬀerent SW measures: Sigma (𝜎), as it is the most widely
reported measure in the literature (Schroter et al., 2012; Monti et al.,
2013; Luppi et al., 2019), and the more recently developed PHI (𝜑),
which displays higher reliability in simulated networks and is designed
for biologically-relevant weighted connectivity (Muldoon et al., 2016).
Please note this is not “PHI” as deﬁned in the context of integrated information theory (Tononi et al., 2016).
The empirical data consists of three independent functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI) datasets that are relevant to consciousness.
Two are propofol anaesthesia datasets; the ﬁrst collected in Cambridge
(referred to as “CAM” dataset onwards), UK (18 participants) comprising a control awake and a moderate sedation condition (Adapa et al.,
2014) and the second in London, Ontario (henceforth referred to as
LON) with 16 participants in control awake and deep sedation conditions (Naci et al., 2018). The third dataset was acquired from patients
with disorders of consciousness (hereafter indicated by “DOC”, Cambridge, UK). This comprised 23 patients of whom 11 are in a Minimally
Conscious State (MCS), and the other 12 diagnosed as Unresponsive
Wakefulness Syndrome (UWS).
The use of these diﬀerent datasets permits us to assess the importance of network dynamics in consciousness independently of the type
of consciousness alteration (i.e., pharmacologically or pathologically induced). To this end, these conditions will be ordered according to decreasing levels of awareness (i.e., “content consciousness” Laureys et al.,
2007). We predict that the temporal complexity of SW, if relevant
to consciousness, will consistently diminish with decreasing levels of
awareness, in accordance to theoretical models (Carhart-Harris et al.,
2014; Tononi et al., 2016; Laureys et al., 2007). Besides analyses at
the whole-brain level, we will also investigate whether these eﬀects are
diﬀerentially driven by diﬀerent subsystems (cortex, subcortex, cerebellum), or the connectivity between them. We will also test whether
any subsystem eﬀects are exclusive to SW or can be extended to other
graph theory measures (namely modularity and participation coeﬃcient) that, similarly to SW, quantify theoretically-relevant functional
segregation (functional division/specialisation) and integration (func2
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tional combination/information merging) from a network science perspective (Rubinov and Sporns, 2010; Sporns and Zwi, 2004; Luppi et al.,
2019; Achard et al., 2012).

2.2.2. Anaesthetic procedure - LON dataset
The procedure was supervised by two anaesthesiologists and one
anaesthetic nurse in the scanning room. Participants also performed an
auditory target-detection task and a memory verbal recall to assess level
of awareness independently from the anaesthesiologists. Additionally,
an infrared camera was used to further assess level of wakefulness.
Propofol was administered intravenously using a Baxter AS50 (Singapore); stepwise increments were applied via a computer-controlled
infusion pump until all three assessors agreed that Ramsay level 5 was
reached (i.e. no responsiveness to visual or verbal incitements). If necessary, further manual adjustments were made to reach target concentrations of propofol which were predicted and maintained stable
by a pharmacokinetic simulation software (TIVA trainer). This software also measured blood concentration levels following the Marsh
3-compartment model. The initial propofol concentration target was
0.6 𝜇g/ml, and step-wise increments of 0.3 𝜇g/ml were applied after
which Ramsay score was assessed. This procedure was repeated until
participants stopped answering to verbally and where rousable only by
physical stimulation at which point data collection would begin. Oxygen titration was put in place to ensure SpO2 above 96%. The mean estimated eﬀect site propofol concentration was 2.48 (1.82–3.14) 𝜇g/ml
and propofol concentration whilst the mean plasma concentration was
2.68 (1.92–3.44). Mean total mass of propofol administered was 486.58
(1.92–3.44). 8 min of RS-fMRI data was acquired.

2. Methods
2.1. Cambridge anaesthesia dataset (CAM)
2.1.1. Participants – CAM dataset
Ethical approval was obtained from the Cambridgeshire 2 Regional
Ethics committee (Adapa et al., 2014). 25 participants were recruited,
however due to incomplete data in the cortex and procedure failure,
a subset of 18 were taken for further analyses. All participants were
healthy and were native English speakers (50% males). Mean age was
33.3. ; ; ; Two senior anaesthetists were present during scanning. Electrocardiography and pulse oximetry were continuously performed whilst
measures of blood pressure, heart rate and oxygen saturation were
recorded regularly.
2.1.2. Anaesthetic protocol – CAM dataset
Propofol sedation was administered intravenously via “target controlled infusion” with a Plasma Concentration mode. An Alaris PK infusion pump (Carefusion, Basingstoke, UK) was used which was controlled
via the Marsh pharmacokinetic model. The anaesthesiologist can thus
decide on a desired plasma 2 “target” and the system will regulate the
infusion rates using patient characteristics as covariates. Three target
plasma levels were used – no drug (awake control), 0.6 μg/ml (low sedation), 1.2 μg/ml (moderate sedation). In this study only the moderate sedation condition is used. Data for this latter condition was taken
20 min after cessation of sedation. Blood samples were taken at the end
of each titration period, before plasma target was altered. The level of
sedation was probed verbally immediately before and after each of the
scanning runs.
10 min of plasma and eﬀect-site propofol concentration equilibration was allowed before cognitive tests were commenced (auditory and
semantic decision tasks). Mean (standard deviation) plasma propofol
concentrations was 304.8 (141.1) mg/ml during light sedation, 723.3
(320.5) mg/ml during moderate sedation and 275.8 (75.42) mg/ml during recovery. Mean (SD) total propofol given was 210.15 (33.16) mg.

2.2.3. Magnetic resonance imaging protocol – LON dataset
A 3-tesla Siemens Trio scanner was used to acquire 256 functional volumes (Echo-planar images [EPI]). Scanning parameters were:
slices = 33, 25% inter-slice gap resolution 3 mm isotropic; TR = 2000 ms;
TE = 30 ms; ﬂip-angle = 75°; matrix = 64 × 64. Order-of-acquisition was
bottom-up interleaved. The anatomical high-resolution T1 weighted images (32-channel coil, 1 mm isotropic voxels) were acquired using a 3D
MPRAGE sequence with TA = 5 mins, TE = 4.25 ms, matrix = 240 × 256,
9° FA. This dataset had broadly insuﬃcient cerebellar cover in MRI images. Hence analyses speciﬁcally involving the cerebellum were not run
for this dataset.
2.3. Disorders of consciousness dataset (DOC)
2.3.1. Patients - DOC dataset
MRI data for 23 DOC patients were collected between January 2010
and July 2015 in the Wolfson Brain Imaging Centre in Addenbrookes
Cambridge, UK (mean time post injury 15.75 For UWS and 16.9 for
MCS). These were selected out of a bigger dataset (n = 71) due to
their relatively intact neuroanatomy. These patients were treated and
scanned at the Wolfson Brain Imaging Centre, Addenbrookes Hospital
(Cambridge, UK). Written informed consent was obtained from an individual that had legal responsibility on making decisions on the patient’s
behalf. These participants were split into unresponsive wakefulness syndrome and minimally conscious state groups (n = 12 for UWS and
n = 11 for MCS) in accordance to the diagnosis given by the attending
physician at Addenbrookes Hospital. Mean CRS-r score was 8.3 (standard deviation 2.03). For the UWS group CRS-r score was 7, (1.41) and
9.75 (1.54) for the MCS group. Mean age for the UWS group was 40.16
(13.63); and for the MCS group 39.18 (18.13). In the UWS group the
aetiology was described as TBI for 3 patients, one hypoxia, one oedema
and the remaining participants having the pathology caused by anoxia.
In the MCS group nine of the patients had a traumatic brain injury, one
a cerebral bleed and one anoxia. In the MCS group 7 were male; whilst
in the UWS group 8 were male. This dataset received ethical approval
from the National Research Ethics Service.

2.1.3. Magnetic resonance imaging protocol – CAM dataset
A Trio Tim 3 tesla MRI machine (Erlangen, Germany), with 12channel head coil was used to obtain 32 descending interleaved oblique
axial slices with an interslice gap of 0.75 mmm and an in-plane resolution of 3 mm. The ﬁeld of view was 192 × 192, repetition time and
acquisition time was 2 s whilst the echo time (TE) was 30 ms and ﬂip
angle 78 degrees. T1-weighted structural images with 1 mm resolution
were obtained using an MPRAGE sequence with TR = 2250 ms, TI =
900 ms, TE = 2.99 ms and ﬂip angle = 9°. 150 timepoints were collected for this dataset (an acquisition that lasted 5 min).
2.2. London Ontario propofol (LON) dataset
2.2.1. Participants - LON dataset
The second anaesthesia dataset used was obtained at the Robarts
Research Institute in London, Ontario (Canada) and was approved by the
Western University Ethics board. 19 healthy (13 males; 18–40 years),
right-handed, English speakers with no reported neurological conditions
signed an informed-consent sheet and received pecuniary compensation
for their time. The study was approved by research ethics boards of
Western University (Ontario, Canada). Due to equipment malfunction
or impairments with the anaesthetic procedure three participants were
excluded (1 male). Thus, 16 participants were included in this study
(Naci et al., 2018).

2.3.2. Magnetic resonance imaging protocol - DOC dataset
A varying number of functional tasks, anatomical and diﬀusion MRI
images were taken for the DOC participants. Only the resting-state data
was used for this study. This was acquired for 10 min (300 vol, TR = 2 s)
3
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using a siemens TRIO 3T scanner. The functional images were acquired
using an echo planar sequence. Parameters include: 3 × 3 × 3.75 mmm
resolution, TR/TE = 2000 ms/30 ms, 78° FA. Anatomical images T1weighted images were acquired using a repetition time of 2300 ms,
TE = 2.47 ms, 150 slices with a cubic resolution of 1 mm.

matrix; whilst the Pearson’s correlations (as is typically used in the
literature) between any two pairs of nodes were considered weighted
(functional connectivity; FC) edges and are represented by the cells in
the matrix (Rubinov and Sporns, 2010; Luppi and Stamatakis, 2020).
Self-connections were set to 0 and NaN values were removed to ensure
graphs represented ROI-to-ROI connections.
There is no consensus regarding how to threshold connectivity matrices (Rubinov and Sporns, 2010; Monti et al., 2013; Crone et al., 2014).
Usually a set of thresholds are used to ensure that results are consistent and not driven by graph topologies at speciﬁc connection densities (Rubinov and Sporns, 2010; Hallquist and Hillary, 2018; van den
Heuvel et al., 2017). Proportional thresholding was used (e.g., top 10%
of correlations). This ensures that the networks compared are of the
same size, have similar properties such as node-connectivity distribution, and that the density of each network was calculated relative to
its size (Rubinov and Sporns, 2010; Hallquist and Hillary, 2018). There
have been critiques (Hallquist and Hillary, 2018; van den Heuvel et al.,
2017) to the use of proportional thresholding in clinical populations as
baseline functional connectivity may be diﬀerent compared to controls
and would introduce spurious eﬀects in the network analysis. It is possible, that graph theory diﬀerences are actually driven by simple FC differences. To obviate this problem, other than controlling for dynamic FC
entropy at the inferential statistic level, weighted networks were used
as lower correlations would have lower inﬂuence on the calculation of
GTA metrics and are reported to ameliorate FC-driven GTA diﬀerences
(van den Heuvel et al., 2017).
To further guard from the problem of the FC-driven GTA diﬀerences, a particularly stringent proportional threshold was used to deﬁne
graphs. 5 thresholds going from 5% to 25% in 5% incremental steps were
used to test a wide-range of connection densities and ensure results are
not driven by any particular arbitrarily-chosen threshold (Rubinov and
Sporns, 2010; Monti et al., 2013; Godwin and Barry, 2015; Luppi and
Stamatakis, 2020). Given the lack of knowledge as to the most appropriate range of thresholds for graph theory analyses, we took this range
from previous studies (Monti et al., 2013; Godwin and Barry, 2015). Of
note is that a previous study investigating the sample entropy of graph
theory dynamics showed results to be stable across similarly deﬁned
thresholds (Pedersen et al., 2017). Additionally, we calculated threshold
speciﬁc results for dynamic small world complexity and its underlying
measures (clustering coeﬃcient and path length) and similarly found
the results to be stable across these thresholds (appendix B).
This procedure led to 5 functional connectivity matrices for each
subject in each timepoint. On each of these connectivity matrices graph
theory metrics were calculated, thus reducing the multidimensional
graph into a single value describing its topology. Sample entropy
(described below, Section 2.6) was calculated on the timeseries of each
of these threshold-speciﬁc graph theory measures and then averaged to
form the independent variables in inferential analyses. The averaging
across threshold-speciﬁc sample entropy values will reduce the inﬂuence of any single threshold on the results. Only positive correlations
were considered as is typical for network neuroscience due to the
dubious interpretation and the preprocessing contingencies associated
with negative weights (Rubinov and Sporns, 2010; Huang et al., 2020;
Dixon et al., 2017).
These weighted-thresholded matrices were analysed using in-house
matlab scripts which utilised functions from the brain connectivity
toolbox (Rubinov and Sporns, 2010). In accordance to previous advice (Hallquist and Hillary, 2018), given how GTA results may be
driven by speciﬁc parcellations (Papo et al., 2016; Yao et al., 2015;
Hallquist and Hillary, 2018), the reproducibility of GTA results was
tested through the use of several network deﬁnitions (namely WB126,
WB553 and the AAL, see appendix A). In evaluating the generalisability
of cortical parcellations, a study from our group showed a parcellation
with about 200 regions may be the most representative (Luppi and
Stamatakis, 2020). Here we followed a diﬀerent strategy, showing that
our results are robust even to substantial changes in parcellation scale

2.4. Preprocessing
All functional images were preprocessed in the same way
using an in-house Matlab script that used SPM12 functions
(https://www.ﬁl.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/software/spm12). After removing
the ﬁrst 5 scans to reach scanner equilibrium, slice-timing correction
was performed (reference slice = no. 17, chosen as it corresponded
to the middle [axially] of the brain). Volumes were realigned to the
mean functional image. This process produced re-alignment parameters which were included in the time series extraction covariates
(described in Section 2.4.1). Finally, using the mean functional image,
spatial normalization to an EPI-template was conducted using the
function “old norm” in SPM as this yielded consistently good results
in comparison to other approaches when assessed visually (similarly
to a previous study Calhoun et al., 2017). Participant-speciﬁc cerebral
spinal ﬂuid and white matter maps, used for the time series extraction
(See Section 2.4.1), were also created using an in-house Matlab (2016a)
script based on SPM functions. Visual inspection of normalization to
standard space was carried for all datasets. Particular attention was
given to the DOC dataset because of the eﬀect that lesions may have on
spatial transformations. Due to insuﬃcient coverage of the cerebellum
in one UWS patient, they were excluded from analyses involving the
cerebellum to avoid bias in results.
2.4.1. Time series extraction
Denoising steps were performed in the Matlab and SPM-based
software CONN (17.f) (https://web.conn-toolbox.org/). It is very important to remove motion-induced artefacts in fMRI data, especially
in DOC data which may display inordinate amount of movement
(Weiler et al., 2021). We applied several methods to ensure movement did not unduly inﬂuence the independent variables. Firstly, movement parameters and their ﬁrst temporal derivative were included as
a ﬁrst-level covariate so as to remove movement-related noise. The
aCompCorr algorithm regressed out CSF, white-matter and motionrelated signals from the time-series (using the ﬁrst 5 principal components; default setting in CONN). This method been shown to perform well in removing movement, respiratory and cardiac artifacts
(Power et al., 2018), especially on DOC patients (Weiler et al., 2021)
and has been previously used for this type of data (Luppi et al., 2019;
Crone et al., 2020). The ART quality-assurance/motion-artefact rejection toolbox (https://www.nitrc.org/projects/artefact_detect), as implemented in CONN, was also used to further remove motion-related artifacts in the timeseries data. This method involves regressing out the
eﬀect of outlier scans (movement > 0.09 mm) in a ﬁrst-level analysis which is suggested to further reduce focal eﬀects of movement that
are not accounted for by the aCompCorr algorithm (Power et al., 2018;
Parkes et al., 2018).
Linear de-trending and a commonly used 0.008–0.09 Hz band-pass
ﬁlter was applied (default in CONN and a widely adopted choice in
the literature on resting-state fMRI) to eliminate low-frequency scanner drifts and potential high-frequency noise. The time-series were extracted controlling for the nuisance variables described above from the
unsmoothed functional volumes to avoid artiﬁcially-induced correlations in clustered regions of interests.
2.5. . Graph theory analysis: graph construction
Graph theory analyses were run on weighted thresholded undirected
connectivity matrices (i.e., graphs). The regions of interest (ROI) corresponded to “nodes” and are placed on the rows and columns of a
4
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Fig. 1. Illustration of method. A) We obtained timeseries for each brain region. B) The timeseries were divided with a sliding window approach (each window
comprising of 24 timepoints and slid by 1 timepoint). C) We then correlated all region timeseries to obtain a weighted graph for each window. D) We calculated SW
(Humphries and Gurney, 2008a; Muldoon et al., 2016; Watts and Strogatz, 1998) for each graph so as to obtain a timeseries of SW values on which E) we calculated
sample entropy. F) We inserted the sample entropy of dynamic small worldness into an ordinal logistic regression as a predictor; with the ordered conditions
(according to presumed level of awareness) as a dependant variable.

(100 and 400). In fact, these parcellations were chosen due to their
diﬀerence in granularity.
To evaluate the network properties of between subsystem graphs
(i.e., cortex-cerebellum, cortex-subcortex and subcortex-cerebellum, results in Section 3.5) we set to zero the irrelevant functional connectivity
values in the graph. This procedure was necessary given that uniquely
extracting the between network connectivity would have led to nonsymmetrical graphs which is not feasible for graph theory analyses. To
threshold the graphs, we ordered the functional connectivity values and
found the value corresponding to the relevant percentile (used in proportional thresholding; e.g., 5%) of non-zero values. We then inserted
this value into the absolute_thresholding.m function of the brain connectivity toolbox (Rubinov and Sporns, 2010). This ensured that the values
which were not relevant to the speciﬁc between subsystem graph did not
inﬂuence the procedure of obtaining sparse networks. We did not run
the between subsystem analyses on the LON dataset due to insuﬃcient
coverage of the cerebellum.
For the creation of time-varying (dynamic) connectivity matrices, a
sliding-window approach was used. In accordance with previous studies
(Luppi et al., 2019; Preti et al., 2017), the timeseries were split into
a window composed of 24 timepoints (48 s) (Fig. 1) which was then
moved by one timepoint. Previous studies have suggested that sliding
windows between 30 and 60 s capture dynamic functional connectivity
ﬂuctuations in a robust manner (Preti et al., 2017). The window sliding
(i.e., step) of one timepoint was chosen as it maximised the length of
the timeseries of graph theory properties. The timeseries were tempered
with a Gaussian window to ensure that the timepoints at the edge of
the windows did not have a great eﬀect on the correlations obtained
following suggestions from previous studies (Preti et al., 2017).
This procedure resulted in 122 graphs for each participant in the
CAM dataset, 271 graphs for the DOC dataset and 251 for the LON

dataset. The measure used (sample entropy) upon the properties of these
graphs (See Section 2.6; Richman and Moorman, 2000) is stable across
diﬀering numbers of time points.
For the sample entropy of functional connectivity (dFC-E), the mean
of the positive values for each unthresholded temporally-speciﬁc FC matrix was calculated giving a timeseries of FC values on which sample
entropy was calculated. Positive values were chosen for the calculation
of dFC-E because the graph theory metrics employed in this study used
positive edges exclusively (Rubinov and Sporns, 2011) and because proportional thresholding, despite retaining the same number of edges, may
retain signiﬁcantly diﬀerent positive average connectivity values across
clinical conditions and individuals, which may in turn inﬂuence graph
theory results (Hallquist and Hillary, 2018; van den Heuvel et al., 2017).
2.5.1. Graph theory properties: deﬁnitions
Small-worldness attempts to quantify a particular topology of selforganising complex systems (Watts and Strogatz, 1998). This particular
architecture is deﬁned by a high clustering-coeﬃcient and a small characteristic path length.
Clustering-coeﬃcient is deﬁned as the fraction of neighbours of a
node that are also neighbours (Rubinov and Sporns, 2010; Watts and
Strogatz, 1998; Humphries and Gurney, 2008; Muldoon et al., 2016;
Telesford et al., 2011) eﬀectively operationalized as:
𝐶𝑖 =

2𝑡𝑖
𝑘𝑖(𝑘𝑖 − 1)

(1)

Where t, the number of connected triangles of node i, is compared to the number of connections (k) of that node. The clustering
coeﬃcient is averaged across nodes to the typical “cliquishness” of
a network (Watts and Strogatz, 1998; Humphries and Gurney, 2008;
Muldoon et al., 2016; Telesford et al., 2011). The function clustering_coef_wu.m from the brain connectivity toolbox (Rubinov and
5
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Sporns, 2010) was used to calculate this. This clustering algorithm cannot be used in between subsystem graphs (e.g., cortex-subcortex) as
there is an impossibility to form triangles when between system edges
are considered exclusively (e.g., cortical node A is connected to subcortical node A; cortical node A is connected to subcortical node B; subcortical node B and A cannot be connected as there are no within subsystem
edges).
Characteristic path-length is calculated as the average of the shortest distance between all pairs of nodes (Watts and Strogatz, 1998) using
Dijkstra’s algorithm and is denoted as L. Small values of L indicate that
information is readily available (easily transmissible) across the network
(Rubinov and Sporns, 2010; Telesford et al., 2011). The charpath function from the brain connectivity toolbox was used to calculate this.
It is common practice to normalise L and C to equivalent (i.e. with
comparable network properties) Erdos-Renyi random networks (Crand &
Lrand; Humphries and Gurney, 2008; Schroter et al., 2012; Monti et al.,
2013). This ensures that the clustering coeﬃcient and path-length rather
than other network properties inﬂuence SW, and thus somewhat operationalises the original SW deﬁnition (i.e., C >> Crand & L ≥ Lrand
Watts and Strogatz, 1998; Humphries and Gurney, 2008). The randomisation parameters and the number of random networks created were
assessed in terms of convergence of values (i.e., recalculating with increasing values until results were consistently similar). Each Crand and
Lrand were calculated from 50 random networks from a rewiring parameter of 5 (in the ranmio_und.m function in brain connectivity toolbox).
The ratio between these random-network normalized values of these
gives small-worldness:
𝜎=

𝛾
=
𝜆

𝐶
𝐶𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑
𝐿
𝐿𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑

For further conceptual and statistical evaluation of the two smallworld measures used in this study see appendix C.
The modularity algorithm (Rubinov and Sporns, 2010; function modularity_und.m, from the brain connectivity toolbox) works by detecting
the (computationally) optimal community structure by dividing the network into groups of nodes with maximised within-group connections
and minimised between-group connection. Here we used the weighted
version of modularity to conserve relevant FC strength information
(Rubinov and Sporns, 2010).
[
]
𝐾𝑗𝑤 𝐾𝑖𝑤
1 ∑
𝑄𝑤 =
𝑊𝑖𝑗 −
𝛿𝑚𝑖 ,𝑚𝑗
(5)
𝑙𝑤 𝑖,𝑗∈𝑁
𝑙𝑤
Where l is the number of links, i and j represent nodes, W the weights,
and K the degree and the 𝛿𝑚𝑖 ,𝑚𝑗 parameter is 1 if the nodes i and j are
in the same module and 0 otherwise.
The participation coeﬃcient is a measure of the richness of intermodular connectivity of all nodes, and requires modularity to have
been calculated already (Rubinov and Sporns, 2010). The participation_coef.m function was used in this study (Rubinov and Sporns, 2010).
𝑦𝑤
𝑖 =1−

𝐶 𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑡−𝐶 𝑜𝑏𝑠
𝐶 𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑡−𝐶 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑
𝐿𝑜𝑏𝑠−𝐿𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑
𝐿𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑡−𝐿𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑

(

𝑚∈𝑀

𝑘𝑤
𝑖 (𝑚 )
𝑘𝑤
𝑖

)2
(6)

Where M is the set of modules, 𝑘𝑤
𝑖 (m) is number of weighted links
between i and all nodes in module m.
All metrics were calculated across the 5 thresholded networks for
each timepoint. All graph theory measures, excepting the SW propensity
(Muldoon et al., 2016), were calculated using the brain connectivity
toolbox (Rubinov and Sporns, 2010).

(2)

Thus, the shorter the normalised path-length (𝜆) and the higher the
normalised clustering coeﬃcient (𝛾), the higher SW-𝜎. Sigma could not
be run on the higher granularity parcellation due to extreme computational requirements.
However, despite being extensively used in the literature (Lord et al.,
2017; Schroter et al., 2012; Monti et al., 2013; Luppi et al., 2019),
this metric has been criticized as 𝜎 is highly dependant on small variations of clustering-coeﬃcient in the random network and is a measure that is primarily driven by clustering coeﬃcient (Papo et al., 2016;
Telesford et al., 2011). It is argued that Crand is an inappropriate normalisation model as high clustering is found in lattice networks and
in fact in the original deﬁnition compares the clustering coeﬃcient of a
SW network to that of a lattice network and the path length to a random
graph (Watts and Strogatz, 1998). Therefore, Telesford et al. (2011) suggest normalising C to the clustering coeﬃcient of an equivalent lattice
network (Clatt).
In fact, for this study the alternative function to calculate
small world topology was taken from Muldoon and colleagues
(Muldoon et al., 2016), which similarly to Telesford and colleague’s
measure (Telesford et al., 2011), uses both lattice and random networks
to normalise C and L. However, they employ a more complete normalisation method which is more faithful to the original deﬁnition of SW
(Watts and Strogatz, 1998) than sigma and more suitable for the analysis
of weighted connectivity matrices (See appendix C and Section 3.3 for
more information).
Δ𝐶 =
Δ𝐿 =

∑

2.6. Sample entropy
In dynamical systems, entropy is a measure of the rate of information produced. Sample entropy was developed speciﬁcally to obviate the
problem of having short and noisy timeseries which is typical of biological datasets (Delgado-Bonal and Marshak, 2019; Richman and Moorman, 2000), and therefore makes it particularly suitable to fMRI derived
timeseries analysis (Luppi et al., 2019; Wang et al., 2014). It additionally
considers sequential information in the timeseries rather than the distribution (e.g., Shannon entropy or standard deviation Waschke et al.,
2021) making it appropriate for analysis of the complexity of a dynamical system (Richman and Moorman, 2000). This measure has been
shown to relate to other measures of complexity (Varley et al., 2020)
indicating it is adept to detecting underling complexity. Furthermore, it
has been shown to correlate with ﬂuid intelligence and in-scanner behaviour, to be reproducible across diﬀerent fMRI sessions and to maintain robustness across diﬀerent parameters (Omidvarnia et al., 2021;
Wang et al., 2014; Pedersen et al., 2017; Zhang et al., 2020). For
these reasons we have selected it as the complexity measure of network property timeseries. Sample entropy is an improvement on approximate entropy, which in turn is based upon Kolomogorov complexity
(Mitchell, 2011; Kolmogorov, 1965). The underlying notion being that
a complex system cannot be easily described, whilst a simple system can
be quickly or brieﬂy summarized.
Sample entropy takes two timeseries segments of diﬀerent lengths
and compares how well each of these segments explains the rest of the
timeseries (via the Chebyshev distance measure, chosen as it was the default in the code obtained from the original creators Richman and Moorman (2000)). Sample entropy is a ratio between how well the smaller
segment explains the data compared to the larger segment, and thus
higher values indicating decreased self-similarity and increased complexity.

(3)

Where L and C indicate path length and clustering coeﬃcient, respectively, of the observed network (obs), an equivalent lattice network
(latt), and a random network (rand). These normalisations in turn give
the SW measure which ranges from 0 to 1 (the algorithm forces values
to 1 in the cases they are above this value):
√
Δ𝐶 2 + Δ𝐿2
𝜙=1−
(4)
2

𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑝𝐸𝑛 = −𝑙𝑜𝑔

6

𝐴
𝐵

(7)
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Where A is how similar the smaller timeseries segment (via Chebyshev distance) to the rest the timeseries. B is how similar the bigger
timeseries segment relates to the rest of the timeseries.
The sequence lengths or timeseries lengths (max = 2, min = 1) were
taken from a study which has looked at sample entropy of graph theory
properties in functional MRI (Pedersen et al., 2017). Whilst the authors
report that these parameters can produce replicable results across independent datasets, there is still no consensus as to how to select optimal parameters. Also taken from this study is the tolerance for accepting matches of similarity which was set to 0.2 times the standard
deviation. This permits the comparison of signals with diﬀerent amplitudes (Richman and Moorman (2000), appendix C) and such a scaling
of this threshold by the standard deviation of the signal is also used
by the original creators of the sample entropy algorithm (Richman and
Moorman, 2000). The algorithm used in this study was used in a previous study with the original creators of the sample entropy algorithm
(Lake et al., 2002).

placed as more aware than the DOC minimally conscious state (MCS)
and DOC unresponsive wakefulness syndrome (UWS), respectively. To
assess the robustness of our results, we performed a second analysis by
substituting the CAM propofol dataset with the LON propofol dataset
which comprised an awake and a deep sedation condition (ordered, respectively, Fig. 1F).
3.1. SW dynamic complexity in the brain
Our hypothesis that dynamic SW sample entropy (dSW-E) predicts
monotonically decreasing levels of awareness was conﬁrmed using an
ordinal logistic regression for both SW measures (Fig. 2: PHI Odds ratios [OR] = 4.14 p = 0.000006; C.I. [conﬁdence intervals of odds ratios
2.5%:97.5%] 2.48: 7.77; Sigma OR: 2.48 p = 0.0002 C.I. 1.48:4.17).
This result was corroborated across diﬀerent parcellations with diﬀerent granularities (presented in appendix D). Furthermore, this result was
replicated in the second analysis with a diﬀerent sedation dataset (i.e.,
LON-DOC datasets = PHI; OR = 2.27 p = 0.001 C.I. 1.30:3.93 and Sigma;
OR = 2.25 p = 0.001, C.I. 1.34:3.74; S2, Fig. 2). This suggests that the unpredictability of dynamic SW architecture reliably scales with increasing
levels of awareness.
This consistency is remarkable given that when we calculated
the two SW measures (PHI and Sigma) on static graphs (i.e. one
graph per participant constructed by averaging across all timepoints
(Schroter et al., 2012; Monti et al., 2013)), they were not correlated
(Rho = 0.17, p = 0.2) and did not yield consistent patterns between
conditions and network deﬁnitions (see appendix C). Conversely, the
two measures of SW when calculated dynamically, proved more informative and showed the same intuitive patterns of decreasing complexity
in lower levels of awareness (Fig. 2).
It is important to assess whether these graph theory entropy metrics truly reﬂect the temporal complexity of the functional architecture
(i.e., topology), or can be explained more parsimoniously by lower order metrics such as the dynamic variation in functional connectivity (FC)
(van den Heuvel et al., 2017). In fact, the entropy of average positive
dynamic FC (chosen as graph theory properties were here calculated
on positive correlations (Rubinov and Sporns, 2010; van den Heuvel
et al., 2017)) was a signiﬁcant predictor for levels of awareness across
parcellations and datasets (e.g., lower granularity whole brain parcellation for CAM-DOC analysis: OR = 1.63, C.I. = 1.02:2.59, p = 0.01,
see appendix E for all results). Such results suggest that awareness entails an unpredictability of dynamic global synchronisation levels (measured by brain region timeseries Pearson’s correlations). This begs the
question whether dynamic SW entropy (dSW-E, Fig. 2) truly reﬂects the
consciousness-predictive complexity of functional topology, or whether
SW entropy results may be better explained by the unpredictability of
global synchronisation.
To investigate this question, we ran a control ordinal logistic regression analysis that involved the same exact procedure used above (Fig. 1f)
with the addition of the sample entropy of dynamic FC (dFC-E) as a covariate predictor. Both SW entropy predictors remained signiﬁcant in
the main analysis (Table 1 and appendix E). However, in the analysis
controlling for dFC-E in the LON-DOC dataset, the dSW-E of Sigma for
the AAL parcellation lost signiﬁcance (Table 1), whilst dSW-E results
remained signiﬁcant in all other parcellations despite controlling for
dFC-E. Of interest is that PHI showed higher eﬀect sizes than sigma suggesting it to be more sensitive to relevant variation ((Papo et al., 2016),
Section 2.5.1, appendix D and F). Of note is also that the complexity
of dynamic functional connectivity (dFC-E) tended to display stronger
eﬀects when inserted as a covariate with the Sigma measure rather than
when inserted with PHI (Table 1).
This control analysis included both dFC-E and dSW-E as co-variate
predictors in the same ordinal logistic regression and found the latter remained signiﬁcant. This suggests that the temporal complexity
of SW architecture predicts increasing levels of awareness above and
beyond what can be explained by the complexity (“compressibility”)

2.7. Inferential analyses: ordinal logistic regression
To assess the hypothesis that the dynamical complexity of graph
theory properties diminished with decreasing levels of awareness ordinal logistic regressions were performed using the polr function of
the MASS R toolbox. This is a regression model for ordinal categorical dependant variables whilst the independent variable is continuous.
This is derived from the logistic regression and is ideally suited to this
study given the hypothesis (monotonic decrease of complexity across
levels of awareness) and the little assumptions underlying it. Nonetheless, multicollinearity was assessed when multiple predictor variables
were included and the proportional odds assumption was tested using
Brants test (using package ‘brant’). The proportional odds assumption
entails the model coeﬃcients have a proportional eﬀect on each group;
I.e., “the slope” estimated between each condition (outcome variable) is
the same or proportional. All tests were one-sided given the directionspeciﬁc hypotheses. To estimate interpretable odds ratio eﬀects sizes,
we ordered the conditions from lowest level of awareness to the highest (UWS>MCS>SED>CON). The reason for this was it produced much
more interpretable odds ratios (i.e., greater than 1 rather than tending
to 0). Odds ratios can be obtained from the regression coeﬃcient independent of ordering via exp(abs(X)), applicable in matlab, r, excel,
python etc.
3. Results
In order to conﬁrm that the dynamics of network SW architecture can
predict altered levels of awareness, we divided whole brain resting-state
fMRI data spatially into diﬀerent parcellations (Fig. 1A) and then split
the resulting timeseries using a sliding window approach (Luppi et al.,
2019; Barttfeld et al., 2015; Preti et al., 2017) (Fig. 1B). Within each
of these windows we constructed a network by relating each brain region’s timeseries to all others, using Pearson’s correlation coeﬃcients
(Fig. 1C). Two small world measures (PHI (Muldoon et al., 2016); and
Sigma (Humphries and Gurney, 2008), Fig. 1D) were calculated on each
of these networks to initially assess the reliability of this approach. In
this manner, we obtained a time-series of SW values on which sample entropy was calculated (Richman and Moorman, 2000) (Fig. 1E), thus obtaining one value for each subject that denotes the richness, or complexity, of their SW ﬂuctuations. Inferential statistics were performed using
ordinal logistic regressions, with sample entropy values as the predictor
variable and ordered conditions as the predicted variable (Fig. 1F).
To assess whether dynamic SW complexity scales with consciousness, we ordered the conditions a-priori according to presumed levels of
awareness, analogously to previous studies looking at the functional network properties of consciousness (Di Perri et al., 2016; Demertzi et al.,
2019). For the main analysis the CAM awake condition was ordered (as
a factor in R) before the CAM moderate sedation, which in turn was
7
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Fig. 2. Dynamic SW properties and ordinal logistic regression results. In the top panel (A) are shown example dynamic
SW properties (3 timepoints) overlaid on a brain template
(Brainmesh_Ch2withCerebellum; BrainNet viewer Xia et al.,
2013). The size of the nodes represents the clustering coefﬁcient of that node, whilst the connections represent the inverse of the path length between the two nodes. The hotter
the colour, the shorter the path length (i.e., how easily information can be transmitted between the nodes, not direct
connectivity). Shown, for illustrative purposes, (top-left) is
an example of a control awake participant (CAM dataset)
and an example of an unresponsive wakefulness syndrome
patient (DOC dataset; bottom-left). Noticeable is the change
in node size (clustering coeﬃcient) and edge colour (path
length) over time in the control participant, which is not so
prominent in the individual aﬀected by UWS. In the bottom
panel (B) violin plots are showing the scaling of dynamic SW
sample entropy with levels of awareness for both the main
and second analysis. Conditions are ordered (left to right) according to a-priori presumed level of awareness (i.e., Awake
> Propofol Sedation > MCS > UWS). The ﬁrst two rows
represent the dynamic PHI and Sigma entropy for a whole
brain parcellation with 126 regions (appendix A), respectively. The third row represents dynamic PHI entropy values for the AAL. Blue triangle represents the median, whilst
the red diamond represents the mean. OLR = ordinal logistic regression coeﬃcients; UWS = unresponsive wakefulness
syndrome; MCS = minimally conscious state; SED = propofol sedation; CON = control awake condition. All ordinal
logistic regression values are standardized for comparison.

of dynamic functional connectivity. This may be taken as a strong indication that the dynamic information produced (measured via sample entropy (Richman and Moorman, 2000)) by functional topological temporal organisation will decrease with diminishing levels of
awareness.

3.2. Dynamic complexity in the brain of the components of small
worldness: clustering and path length
To further elucidate these results (Fig. 2), we investigated whether
the dSW-E eﬀect could be explained by the complexity of the dynamics
8
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Table 1
Odds ratios and p-values for dSW-E and dFC-E when inserted into the same ordinal logistic regression as covariates. Results for all whole-brain parcellations and the CAM-DOC and LON-DOC
analyses.
Parcellation

CAM-DOC
Analysis

WB126
AAL

LON-DOC
Analysis

WB553
WB126
AAL
WB553

SW measure
𝚽
𝝈
𝚽
𝝈
𝚽
𝚽
𝝈
𝚽
𝝈
𝚽

dSW-E
Odds ratios

P-value

dFC-E
Odds ratios

P-value

4.52
2.53
3.85
2.16
3.22
1.80
1.89
2.15
1.32
1.92

0.00001
0.0002
0.00001
0.00150
0.0002
0.04
0.01
0.01
0.13
0.02

1.15
1.61
0.21
1.23
1.09
1.42
1.55
1.12
1.68
1.36

0.30
0.019
0.22
0.070
0.37
0.12
0.049
0.36
0.021
0.16

Table 2
CAM-DOC analysis of diﬀerent whole brain parcellations. The dynamical complexity of clustering coeﬃcient (dCC-E) and
path length (dPL-E), controlled for the dynamical complexity of functional connectivity (dFC-E).
Parcellation

SW component

Clustering Coeﬃcient (CC) and Path Length (PL) dynamic complexity

dFC-E

WB126

dCC-E
dPL-E
dCC-E
dPL-E
dCC-E
dPL-E

Odds ratio
4.28
3.99
10.78
5.12
4.32
3.69

Odds ratio
0.66
0.79
0.37
0.59
0.51
0.80

AAL
WB553

P-value
0.000114
0.000038
0.000002
0.000004
0.003864
0.000146

of the clustering or path length that compose small worldness. We
found that both of these components of SW were predictive of levels
of awareness despite controlling for the complexity of the underlying
FC dynamics (see Table 2). In the CAM-DOC dataset and the lower
granularity parcellation the odds ratio was 4.28 (C.I. = 2.06:9.80,
p = 0.0001) for the clustering coeﬃcient dynamics (dCC-E) and for
the functional connectivity dynamics (dFC-E) the odds ratio was 0.66
(C.I. = 0.31:1.28, p = 0.12). For the path length dynamics (dPL-E),
the odds ratio was 3.99 (C.I. = 2.06:8.18, p<0.0001), whilst the odds
ratio for dFC-E was 0.79 (C.I. = 0.44:1.41, p = 0.21), when inserted
as a covariate in the same model. These results reproduced across
diﬀerent measure implementations (normalised [Muldoon et al., 2016]
or non-normalised) and diﬀerent parcellations (appendix G). Similar
results were found for the LON-DOC dataset with the exception of the
normalised path length in the lower granularity parcellation and, in
the higher granularity parcellation, the clustering coeﬃcient measures
and non-normalised path length (see appendix G for full results). This
indeed suggests that the dynamics of the integration (path length)
and segregation (clustering coeﬃcient) components underlying SW are
individually predictive of levels of awareness.

P-value
0.119
0.211
0.003
0.045
0.093
0.247

thought it paramount to assess the convergence of results between diﬀerent SW implementations (Sigma and PHI). Given the strong convergence
of results across control analyses (varying parcellation type, granularity, dataset and SW measures; Table 1; Fig. 2), we continued with one
measure. Although Sigma is widely used in the published literature, it
is computationally expensive when run on time-varying networks and
it is based on a normalisation method that is not completely faithful
to the original deﬁnition (Watts and Strogatz, 1998). It normalises the
network’s clustering coeﬃcient to a random network, whilst the original deﬁnition states that small world “systems can be highly clustered,
like regular lattices, yet have small characteristic path lengths, like random graphs” (Watts and Strogatz, 1998, p.440). The PHI measure on the
other hand assesses clustering and path length as divergence from lattice and random networks, respectively (Muldoon et al., 2016, appendix
C, 2.5.1). PHI’s normalisation method was also speciﬁcally designed to
be used with weighted networks, thus being more adept at preserving
biologically relevant information and controlling for the underlying FC
eﬀects (as shown by the diﬀerence in dFC-E eﬀects when PHI and Sigma
are inserted as covariates in the same analyses; Table 1). Furthermore,
PHI seemed to produce higher eﬀect sizes across measures in predicting
levels of awareness (Section 3.1, Table 1) and is computationally much
more viable. For these reasons we continued analyses with the PHI measures only, having ascertained the convergence of alternative deﬁnitions
of small-world networks when calculated dynamically.
The complexity of dynamic SW topology had unique predictive power for levels of awareness in the cortical (OR = 3.67
p = 0.000006 C.I. = 2.03:6.62) and subcortical (OR = 6.96 p = 0.000003
C.I. = 3.00:14.88) network deﬁnitions. The cerebellar parcellation displays a signiﬁcant trend (Fig. 3; OR = 1.68, p = 0.02, C.I. = 1.01:2.88;
appendix I).
Remarkably, the eﬀect sizes for the subcortex were greater than those
of the cortex when inserted in the same ordinal logistic regression as covariates (appendix I), whilst the cerebellum also displayed unique predictive power. The LON-DOC datasets showed convergent results with
the exception of the high granularity cortical parcellation (400 nodes;
p = 0.08, appendix H). Furthermore, when we added dFC-E as a covariate to dSW-E, both the cortex and subcortex remained signiﬁcant,

3.3. Dynamic small-world entropy in the cortex, subcortex and cerebellum
Given that dynamic entropy of both SW measures (𝜑 & 𝜎) consistently predicted levels of awareness at the whole-brain level, we sought
to explore whether the dSW-E of major cytoarchitectonically distinct
subdivisions of the brain (i.e., cortex, subcortex and cerebellum) are relevant to consciousness and diﬀerentially explain the above whole-brain
eﬀects found in both high and low granularity parcellations.
This analysis is relevant to debates in the literature in which, some
postulate the importance of the cortex in consciousness (Tononi et al.,
2016; Ledoux and Brown, 2017); whilst others posit an essential role
for the subcortex (Carhart-Harris and Friston, 2019; Panksepp, 2011;
Solms, 2013).
Given the instability of SW measures when calculated on timeaveraged networks, as shown by the inconsistences between previously
published results (e.g., 29,31) and in the present study (appendix C), we
9
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Fig. 3. Subsystem dynamic SW properties and ordinal logistic regression results. In the left panel (A) are shown example dynamic SW properties (3 timepoints) for
the cortex, subcortex and cerebellum (templates: BrainMesh_Ch2withCerebellum; BrainMesh_ICBM152_smoothed; BrainMesh Cerebellum, respectively, created in
BrainNet viewer Xia et al., 2013). Node size represents the clustering coeﬃcient of that node, whilst the connections represent the inverse of the path length between
the two nodes. The hotter the colour, the shorter the path length. Shown are three timepoints for the cortex (red nodes; no = 100), subcortex (blue nodes; no = 54)
and the cerebellum (green nodes; no = 99), for an awake participant (CAM dataset). In the right panel (B) violin plots are showing the scaling of dynamic PHI sample
entropy with levels of awareness. Blue triangle represents the median, whilst the red diamond represents the mean. Conditions are ordered (left to right) according
to a-priori presumed levels of awareness (i.e., Awake > Propofol Sedation > MCS > UWS). The ﬁrst row shows the cortical, the second the subcortical and the last
the cerebellar results. OLR = ordinal logistic regression coeﬃcients; UWS = unresponsive wakefulness syndrome; MCS = minimally conscious state; SED = propofol
sedation; CON = control awake condition. All ordinal logistic regression values are standardized for comparison.

whilst the cerebellum dSW-E was not signiﬁcant (p = 0.055; Appendix
J). When controlling for dFC-E, the sSubcortex dSW-E again had higher
odds ratios (OR = 6.23) than the cortex (OR = 3.49) in both datasets,
although the cortex violated regression assumptions in the CAM-DOC
analysis (Appendix J).
A similar pattern was observed in the LON-DOC dataset (appendix
J). These results suggest that the complexity of subcortical dynamic
SW topology may be more consistently sensitive to decreasing levels
of awareness than the cortex.
We then investigated whether these measures were correlated to
behavioural metrics (bedside diagnostic assessments of consciousnessimpairment in DOC patients via the Coma Recovery Scale-revised [CRS-r
(Giacino et al., 2004)]; and pharmacological plasma propofol concentration metrics (in CAM dataset). This would elucidate the potential relevance of dSW-E to clinically-relevant observable behaviour (in the case
of CRS-r) and the amount of propofol found in the blood. We found
that subcortex dSW-E was inversely correlated to Propofol plasma concentration in the CAM dataset (rho = −0.38, p = 0.022). However,

this correlation did not survive Bonferroni correction for the diﬀerent parcellations and measures used. Propofol plasma concentration is
known to correlate with individual diﬀerences in consciousness recovery
time and the underlying genetic variation relevant to pharmacokinetics
(Kansaku et al., 2011). The relationship between subcortical network
dynamics and propofol concentration may relate to individual diﬀerences in pharmacodynamic eﬀect on the brain and therefore diﬀerences
in levels of awareness. There was also a correlation between SW entropy of PHI of the cortex and CRS-r (rho = 0.56, p = 0.004), but this
did not replicate in the higher granularity parcellation. Although this
behavioural measure is considered the most comprehensive instrument
to detect consciousness at the bedside (Giacino et al., 2004; Edlow et al.,
2021) it should be noted that behavioural responsiveness is not a perfect
correlate of consciousness (e.g., Owen et al., 2008) and may vary substantially within patients (Wannez et al., 2017). Thus, such a correlation
may indicate that cortical dynamic complexity is related to consciousness, but not unequivocally so.
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Table 3
Main analyses (CAM-DOC datasets). Predictive power of the complexity
of dynamic modularity (dM-E) and participation coeﬃcient (dPC-E) when
controlling for functional connectivity complexity (dFC-E). Odds ratios
and p-values.
Parcellation

Cortex100
Subcortex
Cerebellum

dM-E and dPC-E
Measure
Odds ratio

P-value

dFC-E
Odds ratio

P-value

dM-E
dPC-E
dM-E
dPC-E
dM-E
dPC-E

0.00800
0.17665
0.00105
0.00022
0.00109
0.00003

1.71
1.79
1.60
1.80
1.01
1.08

0.02
0.02
0.04
0.01
0.48
0.39

1.94
1.28
2.61
3.06
2.47
3.77

3.5. Predictive power of dynamic graph theory metrics for between
subnetwork dynamics beyond dynamic functional connectivity
Until now we have investigated the predictive power of network dynamics of the whole-brain and of individual subsystems (cortex, subcortex and cerebellum). In Information Integration Theory (Tononi et al.,
2016) and other accounts of consciousness (Baars, 2005; Alkire et al.,
2008; Lamme, 2006; Shine et al., 2019), the communication between
subsystems (e.g., between the cortex and subcortex) has been proposed
as fundamental to the emergence of complex awareness. Therefore, we
also investigated whether between subsystems network dynamics were
predictive of levels of awareness. Speciﬁcally, we deﬁned three dynamically varying between-system networks: cortex-cerebellum, cortexsubcortex and subcortex-cerebellum (described in section 2.5). We calculated the dynamic complexity of path length, participation coeﬃcient
and modularity. The clustering coeﬃcient and therefore small world
propensity could not be calculated as networks deﬁned in this manner
are not amenable to this measure (explained in methods, Section 2.5).
We found that all between system graphs and network properties displayed dynamics that were predictive of levels of awareness despite controlling for the underlying functional connectivity. Results are presented
in Table 4.

3.4. Sample entropy of integration and segregation dynamic graph theory
metrics for the cortex, subcortex and cerebellum
Given that subcortical dSW-E has more predictive power than the
cortex, we sought to investigate whether this striking eﬀect (Fig. 3)
is speciﬁc to SW or can be generalised to other topological organisation (graph theory) measures that are relevant to consciousness
theory. To this end, we chose two measures that are conceptually
(in terms of integration and segregation Rubinov and Sporns, 2010;
Sporns and Zwi, 2004; Lord et al., 2017) and statistically related to SW
(Jarman et al., 2017). The ﬁrst is modularity, which measures the extent to which a network can be divided, therefore being a proxy measure for segregation in terms of functional diﬀerentiation at a network
level. The second measure is participation coeﬃcient, that measures to
what extend diﬀerent modules (i.e., functional subdivisions calculated
via modularity) of the network are interconnected, therefore indicating
the degree of integration in terms of the merging of information from
diﬀerent modules. We analysed these measures as we did SW in the
previously described procedure (from Fig. 1D onwards).
Firstly, we established whether the complexity of network dynamics
had predictive power in the cortex, subcortex and cerebellum. We found
that the complexity of dynamic modularity (dM-E) could predict levels
of awareness beyond the complexity of dFC-E in all subsystems (cortex,
subcortex and cerebellum see Table 3). The dynamics of participation
coeﬃcient had predictive power only in the subcortex and cerebellum
(Table 3). In the alternative analysis (with LON-DOC datasets) results
did not reproduce for the dM-E of the cortex (see appendix K for full
results).
Remarkably, when we inserted the complexity of dynamic participation coeﬃcient (dPC-E) of the diﬀerent subsystems into the same
model, we saw that the odds ratio (OR) of the cerebellum (OR = 2.76;
C.I. = 1.46:5.71, p = 0.001) was higher than both that of the subcortex (OR = 2.14; C.I. = 1.08:4.44, p = 0.01) and cortex (OR = 1.09;
C.I. = 0.63:1.90, p = 0.36) (appendix M). The complexity of modularity dynamics (dM-E) had higher eﬀect sizes (i.e., odds ratios) in the
subcortex (OR = 2.15 C.I. = 1.10:4.42, p = 0.013) than the cortex
(OR = 1.52; C.I. = 0.86:2.75, p = 0.07) and the cerebellum (OR = 1.61;
C.I. = 0.86:3.07, p = 0.06). These results also reproduced in the second
analysis (appendix M).
Using the behavioural scores collected in the original semantic propofol study for the CAM dataset (Adapa et al., 2014) we
found that subcortical dPC-E was inversely correlated to reaction time
(Rho = −0.40, p = 0.017). Speculatively, reaction time may indicate a
change in the consciousness-relevant global availability of information
(e.g., Global Neuronal Workspace; (Baars, 2005, 2002)). However, we
take this correlation as evidence that subcortical dPC-E is relevant to
observable behaviour which may only be tangentially related to consciousness proper. Overall, these results suggest that decreasing subcortical complexity of network dynamics (beyond SW) is a characteristic of
decreasing levels of awareness.

3.5.1. Independent predictive power of between and within subsystem
network dynamics
We then tested whether between subsystem network dynamics had
any independent predictive power compared to within subsystem network dynamics. To this end we inserted all within and between system (cortex, subcortex and cerebellum) dynamic network complexity
measures in the same analysis and ran an ordinal logistic regression
for each graph theory metric (small worldness, participation coeﬃcient
and modularity). We found that for the dynamic complexity of participation coeﬃcient, the cortex (OR = 0.44, C.I. 0.20:0.95, p = 0.021),
the cerebellum (OR = 2.22, C.I. = 1.01:5.21, p = 0.027), the cortexsubcortex network (OR = 2.88, C.I. = 1.21:7.60, p = 0.01) and the
subcortex-cerebellum (OR = 2.59, C.I. = 0.99:7.07, p = 0.028) were signiﬁcant predictors. For the dynamical complexity of modularity only the
subcortex-cerebellar topology was a signiﬁcant predictor (OR = 2.07,
C.I. = 0.97:4.60, p = 0.03). Finally, for the dynamical complexity
of path length, only the subcortex showed signiﬁcance (OR = 2.21,
C.I. = 1.03:5.00, p = 0.02), however the assumptions of the ordinal logistic regression were violated for this model (Brant’s test p <0.05).
These results (Table 5) conﬁrm that dynamic network structure between subsystems may also be independently predictive of levels of
awareness. Speciﬁcally, the dynamic organisation of subcortex in relation to the cortex and cerebellum seems to have independent predictive power compared to other networks. Thus, these analyses support
the notion that the mode of communication between cytoarchitectonically diﬀerentiated systems of the brain may indeed be important for the
emergence of consciousness (Tononi et al., 2016; Di Perri et al., 2016;
Alkire et al., 2008; Guldenmund et al., 2013; Spindler et al., 2021).
3.6. Independent predictive power of dynamic graph theory metrics for the
cortex, subcortex and cerebellum
Finally, we sought to investigate whether the complexity of the various network properties investigated (small worldness, participation coeﬃcient and modularity) had independent predictive power in the different subsystems (cortex, subcortex and cerebellum). To this end, we
inserted all dynamic complexity metrics (dSW-E, dM-E and dPC-E) as covariates in the same ordinal logistic regression as this would permit further interpretation. We found that dSW-E had unique predictive power
in the cortex (OR:3.49, C.I. = 1.88:6.89 p = 0.00007) and the subcortex
(OR:5.12, C.I. = 2.18:13.61 p = 0.0002). Conversely, dPC-E had independent predictive power in the cerebellum (OR:3.30, C.I. = 1.73:6.81,
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Table 4
Between subsystem ordinal logistic regression results for the dynamic complexity of path
length (dPL-E), modularity (dM-E) and participation coeﬃcient (dPC-E).

Network
Cortex-cerebellum
Cortex-cerebellum
Cortex-cerebellum
Cortex-subcortex
Cortex-subcortex
Cortex-subcortex
Subcortex-cerebellum
Subcortex-cerebellum
Subcortex-cerebellum

Measure
dPL-E
dM-E
dPC-E
dPL-E
dM-E
dPC-E
dPL-E
dM-E
dPC-E

Dynamic graph theory complexity

dFC-E

Odds ratios
4.68
2.72
3.50
3.72
1.80
4.63
4.12
2.99
4.83

Odds ratio
0.67
1.20
0.96
0.76
1.41
0.96
0.66
1.08
1.08

p-value
0.00001
0.00036
0.00003
0.00042
0.01602
0.00001
0.00046
0.00043
0.00001

p-value
0.10
0.23
0.45
0.21
0.10
0.45
0.14
0.39
0.39

Table 5
Odds ratios and p-values for between and within subsystem network dynamics when inserted into the same ordinal logistic regression. Results for the
dynamic complexity of participation coeﬃcient (dPC-E), modularity (dM-E) and path length (dPL-E) presented.
Measure

Cortex

dPC-E
dM-E
dPL-E

Odds Ratio
2.20
1.25
1.55

Subcortex
p-value
0.02
0.23
0.13

Odds Ratio
1.34
1.67
2.21

Cerebellum
p-value
0.20
0.07
0.02

Odds Ratio
2.22
1.23
1.00

p-value
0.03
0.29
0.50

Cortex-cerebellum

Cortex-subcortex

Subcortex-cerebellum

Odds Ratio
1.01
1.46
2.46

Odds Ratio
2.88
1.22
1.36

Odds Ratio
2.59
2.07
1.04

p-value
0.50
0.17
0.07

p-value
0.01
0.28
0.26

p-value
0.03
0.03
0.47

Table 6
For main (CAM-DOC) analysis. dM-E, dPC-E and dSW-E inserted in the same ordinal logistic
regression as covariates for each subsystem (cortex [two granularities 100 and 400], subcortex,
and cerebellum), odds ratios (OR), p-values and omnibus brants test presented.
NETS

COR-100
COR-400
SUB
CEREB

dPC-E
Odds ratios

p-value

dM-E
Odds ratios

p-value

dSW-E
Odds ratios

p-value

0.79
1.13
1.76
3.30

0.2092
0.3228
0.0749
0.0003

1.71
1.36
1.60
1.73

0.04
0.16
0.09
0.06

3.49
2.28
5.12
0.80

0.00007
0.00566
0.00021
0.24885

p = 0.0003). See Table 6 for more details for each measure in each subsystem. In the alternative anaesthesia dataset, we found results to not
reproduce for the cortex (see appendix N for full analyses). Either way,
these results indicate that dSW-E is predictive of levels of awareness in
the subcortex when controlling for the dynamics of other network properties, whilst the dynamics of participation coeﬃcient had independent
predictive power for the cerebellum. This is a signiﬁcant result, as theorists have indicated that the cerebellum may not be important for consciousness (Tononi et al., 2016). Our analysis shows that the cerebellum
does indeed display uniquely predictive consciousness-relevant dynamics at a network level. Across all subsystems and measures the subcortex
had the greatest eﬀect size.

Cavanna et al., 2018) in diﬀerent states of consciousness have been
widely reported. We advance this body of research by showing that the
sample entropy of dynamic FC is predictive of levels of awareness; but
importantly, we additionally show that network architecture dynamics
have consistent explanatory power above and beyond the variations in
functional connectivity.
This suggests that awareness has characteristic dynamic global information architectures (topologies) that cannot be reduced to simple
FC. In other words, the dynamic re-conﬁguration of the global functional architecture (“the interrelation of parts”), rather than the absolute synchronisation of brain regions, may be particularly important to
consciousness. These ﬁndings, therefore, speak to theories that posit a
global workspace (of information Baars, 2005), or the irreducibility of
the whole to its parts (Tononi et al., 2016). In fact, we show that the
dynamics of architectures that favour integration and segregation consistently scale with increasing levels of awareness. It is therefore possible
that such architectures may contribute to an integrated dynamic global
workspace of information across time.
A key result of this study may supply some interpretations in regards
to what may be particularly important for consciousness emergence.
This is the diﬀerence between cortical and subcortical eﬀects. Although
the cortex was a signiﬁcant predictor on its own, we found that the complexity of dynamic subcortical topology is more consistent and powerful
in predicting levels of awareness than the cortex. This suggests that the
complexity of topological functional dynamics in the subcortex is particularly sensitive to diﬀerent levels of awareness.
In fact, the subcortical system is thought to provide fundamental
(aﬀective, interoceptive and sensory) inputs for cortical processing, and
is hypothesised to have underpinned the ﬁrst subjective experiences in
evolutionary history and subsequent phylogenic development of higherorder self-awareness (Carhart-Harris and Friston, 2019; Panksepp, 2011;

4. Discussion
In consonance with our hypothesis, a key ﬁnding of this study is that
the temporal complexity of network architecture increases with levels of
awareness. We integrate graph theory (Schroter et al., 2012; Monti et al.,
2013; Achard et al., 2012; Crone et al., 2014) and dynamics (Luppi et al.,
2019; Barttfeld et al., 2015; Huang et al., 2020; Demertzi et al., 2019) to
show that the temporal complexity of information architecture reliably
scales with levels of awareness. Importantly, we show that the complexities of subcortical changes over time is particularly predictive of levels
of awareness. Such cortical and subcortical dynamics possibly underlie
the varied streams of contents and states that characterise consciousness
as an inherently dynamic phenomenon (Tononi et al., 2016; CarhartHarris and Friston, 2019; Dehaene and Christen, 2011; James, 1890;
Ledoux and Brown, 2017; Panksepp, 2011).
Previously, changes in static (Di Perri et al., 2016; Stamatakis et al.,
2010; Naci et al., 2018) and dynamic functional connectivity
(Barttfeld et al., 2015; Demertzi et al., 2019; Golkowski et al., 2019;
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Solms, 2013). Despite studies on the dynamics of consciousness tend to
focus mainly on the cortex (Barttfeld et al., 2015; Huang et al., 2020;
Demertzi et al., 2019), recent evidence (Lutkenhoﬀ et al., 2020a) shows
that the complexity of cortical response to perturbation in DOC inversely correlates with atrophy in arousal-related subcortical structures
rather than in cortical structures. Of note is that the cortex may have a
larger variation between subjects than the subcortex (Salehi et al., 2020;
Feilong et al., 2018) which is philogenically older and supports basic
physiological functions (Panksepp, 2011). This is especially pertinent
in the DOC dataset which is characterised by ischaemic or traumatic
damage which may induce a subsequent reorganisation of brain function (e.g., Crone et al., 2014; Lamme, 2006; Lutkenhoﬀ et al., 2020a).
Nonetheless, dynamic complexity was calculated using the subject speciﬁc timeseries, and therefore did not rely on variability between subjects and conditions (e.g., Huang et al., 2020; Salehi et al., 2020).
Although some authors propose that subcortical structures function as an unconscious modulator of behaviour and cognitive conscious access (Ledoux and Brown, 2017), rather than underpinning basic awareness (Panksepp, 2011; Solms, 2013), these results suggest that
investigations into consciousness that focus exclusively on the cortex
(Tononi et al., 2016; Baars, 2005), may necessitate further veriﬁcation
in the future (Shewmon et al., 1999). In fact, the present results suggest that investigating subcortical information may aid ﬁner diﬀerentiation of diﬀerent conscious states (Panksepp, 2011; Lutkenhoﬀ et al.,
2020a,b) for clinical purposes.
In a similar vein, although some researchers do not consider the cerebellum important for consciousness (Tononi et al., 2016); we found that
integration-relevant network dynamics (particularly dPC-E) had predictive power for levels of awareness beyond other network dynamics (dSW-E & dM-E) in this system. Interestingly, theorists have posited
that the cerebellum may not be fundamental to consciousness due to its
lack of integrative capacity (Tononi et al., 2016). Conversely, our analysis suggests that a network property which is relevant to integration
(participation coeﬃcient being a measure of intramodular connectivity) is most predictive in the cerebellum (Table 6). Furthermore, we
also show that dPC-E has unique predictive power in the cerebellum
even when controlling for the underlying functional connectivity dynamics (Table 3) and the network dynamics of other systems (Section
3.4). These results lend support to notions that the cerebellum may have
a discernible role in awareness (Clausi et al., 2017; Johnson et al., 2019).
Furthering our understanding of the network dynamics associated
with awareness, we also show that the temporal variation of the network
topology between the cortex, subcortex and cerebellum are signiﬁcant
predictors of levels of awareness. Speciﬁcally, the dynamic architecture
of activity coordination between the subcortex and the cortex and between the subcortex and cerebellum have independent predictive power
when participation coeﬃcient is investigated. Beyond suggesting the relevance of systems beyond the cortex to consciousness, this also suggests
that typical awareness might be characterised by a dynamic cooperation
between the cytoarchitectonically distinct regions (Shine et al., 2019;
Spindler et al., 2021).
Another contribution of this paper is the investigation of the relevance of SW as a metric for consciousness. Although several measures of SW have been proposed (Humphries and Gurney, 2008;
Muldoon et al., 2016; Telesford et al., 2011); its calculation in static
functional brain networks have been problematic (Rubinov and
Sporns, 2010). Such issues, other than being evidenced by the
inconsistency between previously published studies on consciousness (Schroter et al., 2012; Monti et al., 2013; Luppi et al.,
2019; Barttfeld et al., 2015; Achard et al., 2012; Crone et al.,
2014), were found within this study (appendix C). Here, conversely, we show that the richness of the dynamics of this topological measure robustly decreases with diminishing levels of awareness, independently of the cause of unconsciousness, dataset, brain
region deﬁnition, threshold, and diﬀerent measures of SW. The SW
topology implies an information communication architecture that is

simultaneously eﬃcient and specialised. We show that the dynamics
of these two components underlying SW, path length and clustering
coeﬃcient, are individually predictive of levels of awareness. Such
SW components are thought to be related to information transmission and cognition in both health and disease (Sporns and Zwi, 2004;
van den Heuvel et al., 2008; Bassett and Bullmore, 2017; Tan and
Cheong, 2017; Takagi, 2018; Schilling, 2005; Yu et al., 2011; Wu et al.,
2012; Achard et al., 2006; Zhu et al., 2020). Therefore, it is possible that
the reconﬁguration of SW topology over time may indicate variations
in information processing (and therefore cognitive states (Bassett and
Bullmore, 2017)), which would intuitively increase proportionally to
the level of awareness (Carhart-Harris et al., 2014; Tononi et al., 2016;
Laureys et al., 2007). In fact, neural variability has been proposed
to be essential to normal brain function (Northoﬀ and Huang, 2017;
Waschke et al., 2021). Corroborating this point are several lines of
research that show how the dynamics of functional networks are related to diﬀerent types of cognition (e.g., Baars, 2002; Wu et al., 2012;
Achard et al., 2006; Zhu et al., 2020). Such cognition-related changes
over time would presumably have an overlap with experiential dynamics that are characteristic of awareness.
However, we have also shown that consciousness-relevant
topological dynamics are not limited to SW. The sample entropy of dynamic modularity and participation coeﬃcient, may
index changes in the formation and inter-communication of dynamic functional subsystems (e.g., in visual attention), and as
such may provide a good metric of variations in the stream of
conscious contents or cognitive states that is typical for consciousness (Edelman and Gally, 2013; Di Perri et al., 2016; Godwin and
Barry, 2015; Huang et al., 2020; Dixon et al., 2017; Margulies et al.,
2016). Speciﬁcally, we show that, although these measures are predictive beyond functional connectivity dynamics when considered
individually, participation coeﬃcient had unique predictive power
when in cerebellum. Analogously to SW, participation coeﬃcient and
modularity have been shown to be related to cognition and information
processing (Godwin and Barry, 2015; Finc et al., 2017; Han et al., 2020;
Bertolero et al., 2018; Cohen and Esposito, 2016; Hilger et al., 2017;
Arnemann et al., 2015). Thus, these interpretations are complementary
to those made above for SW, in that the dynamic entropy of these GTA
properties may indicate dynamic variations in information processing
state (and therefore, contents of consciousness).
Given the potential existence of many diﬀerent types (or dimensions) of consciousness, that the dynamic complexity of several graph
theory properties may display predictive power, and that these measures display high within condition standard deviations (Figs. 2 & 3);
we tentatively suggest that these results may primarily relate to the
epi‑phenomenology of consciousness. In other words, the dynamic complexity of functional topology necessarily arises with consciousness, but
it may not be a suﬃcient condition for the emergence of awareness.
4.1. Strengths and weaknesses
As for the strengths and weakness of this study; the temporal resolution of the data-collection technique and the sliding window approach constitute a limitation of this study, as it only can measure coarse
timescales of brain activity. Furthermore, DOC data is inherently noisy
and is characterised by high degrees of variability and misdiagnosis.
We selected this subset of participants out of a bigger dataset to ensure the data had acceptable quality. The ordering of conditions into
decreasing levels of awareness may be controversial, in that it reduces
subjective qualitative states to a two-dimensional quantity, despite being clinically (Laureys et al., 2007; Giacino et al., 2004), theoretically
(Carhart-Harris et al., 2014; Tononi et al., 2016), and intuitively justiﬁed. Furthermore, there may be potential to confound behavioural responsiveness with awareness in this study. The use of such ordered conditions of awareness as a dependant variable may somewhat mitigate
such a problem; however, the behavioural metrics used (coma recovery
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scale for DOC and reaction time for moderate anaesthesia) are primarily related to behavioural responsiveness. To date responsiveness is still
one of the best markers of conscious awareness as it is routinely used at
the bedside (e.g., Ramsay scale for anaesthesia or coma recovery scale
for DOC). Behavioural responsiveness, however, is not necessarily equal
to awareness (e.g., Crone et al., 2020; Adapa et al., 2014; Giacino et al.,
2004; Cohen and Esposito, 2016; Owen et al., 2008; Owen et al., 2008).
Nonetheless, the results using behavioural measures support the notion
that the approach used herein does have relevance to observable wilful
behaviour, which tends to be correlated with consciousness.
Conversely, in light of inconsistencies between previously published
studies, the use of diﬀerent SW measures and related graph theory measures constitute a strength of this study. In fact, the explicit controlling
for the dynamic FC (which underlies the graph theory measures) is a ﬁrst
in graph-theory consciousness research and consolidates the robustness
and interpretation of results (van den Heuvel et al., 2017). The investigation of between subsystem topology (e.g., cortex to subcortex exclusively, Table 4) is also novel to our knowledge. The additional use of
an independent dataset to validate results, and the use of diﬀerent parcellations (with diﬀerent brain region deﬁnitions but similar numbers
(AAL, N = 116 and WB126, N = 126), and with similar deﬁnitions but
diﬀerent granularities (WB125, WB553 described in appendix A), serve
to augment assurance in these results (Hallquist and Hillary, 2018).
These control analyses expand on the study by Crone and colleagues
(Crone et al., 2020) which investigated the variability over time of graph
theory properties, one of which (clustering coeﬃcient) is part of the SW
measure. The use of sample entropy also may constitute a development
of this study as it takes into account the temporally sequential information inherent in the data in a way that is robust to noise (Varley et al.,
2020; Richman and Moorman, 2000; Wang et al., 2014), rather than
calculating variability over all available data (see Section 2.6 for further discussion of this measure). Whilst Crone and colleagues focused
on dissociating consciousness from responsiveness in a DOC cohort, we
adopt a diﬀerent approach to the same end in showing that the complexity of network dynamics scales across vastly diﬀerent consciousnessrelevant conditions. The present investigation of the independent predictive power of diﬀerent subsystems in the brain and diﬀerent graph
theory measures also provides an advancement on previous knowledge.
Of interest is that the CAM-DOC analysis tended to produce stronger
eﬀect sizes than the LON-DOC analysis (Table 1, Fig. 1, appendices D–
N). This may be due to the fact that the anaesthetic condition in the
LON dataset was characterised by relatively more sedation than the CAM
dataset (Sections 2.1.2 and 2.2.2) and perhaps is less appropriately ordered as in the present study (after control awake condition and before
minimally conscious state). Another explanation for the diﬀerence in effect sizes between analyses (CAM-DOC and LON-DOC), is that the CAM
and DOC datasets were recorded at the same site, using the same scanner, whilst the LON-DOC analysis is eﬀectively a cross-site analysis, potentially introducing confounds in the data. Nonetheless, although the
LON dataset did not have suﬃcient coverage of the cerebellum thus impeding a reproduction of cerebellar speciﬁc results, the LON-DOC analysis consistently replicated subcortical results (appendices H–N). This
further supports the robustness of subcortical dynamics in predicting
diﬀerent levels of awareness.

be particularly important in typical awareness. The dynamics of functional topology between the subcortex and other systems (cortex and
cerebellum) also display unique predictive power. The complexity of
dynamic small world architecture is most predictive for the cortex and
the subcortex. The participation coeﬃcient, conversely has independent
predictive power for the cerebellum.
Data availability
The
Coon
toolbox
is
available
to
download
from
http://www.nitrc.org/projects/conn. The brain connectivity toolbox, which was used for the graph theory measures can be obtained gratuitously online (https://sites.google.com/site/bctnet/).
Sigma was calculated fusing the BCT functions and following
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5. Conclusion
We conclude, with a reasonable amount of conﬁdence, that the complexity of dynamic topology (in other words: the re-organisation of
functional information architecture) does increase with the emerging
of awareness. We tentatively suggest that dynamics of information processing architecture reﬂects changes in cognitive content/mental state
which is an intuitive characteristic of the vernacular “stream of consciousness”. The predictive power of the subcortex’s dynamic topology
is higher and more consistent compared to that of the cortex or the cerebellum, suggesting that the dynamic re-organisation of this system may
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